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Gratian and the Jews 
Kenneth Pennington 
Since Anders Winroth and Carlos Larrainzar discovered earlier 
versions of Gratian’s Decretum, legal historians have explored 
these manuscripts for evidence that they hoped would reveal how 
Gratian’s changes and additions to his text could provide insights 
into how his thought and ideas developed.1  Although there is 
still a vigorous debate about exactly how the manuscript tradition 
reflects the evolution of his Decretum, we know far more about 
Gratian now than we did before.  Not everyone agrees on what 
we know.  I think that Gratian began teaching in the 1120s, that 
the Saint Gall manuscript 673 is the earliest witness to his 
teaching, and that the other manuscripts discovered by Winroth 
and Larrainzar provide evidence that a version of his Decretum 
circulated widely in the 1130s.  The final version of his 
Decretum ca. 1140 was compiled by gradually adding canons to 
various parts of the text over an extended period of time.2  That is 
an outline of what I think we know.   
1
 Anders Winroth’s book, The Making of Gratian’s Decretum (Cambridge 
2000), was responsible for opening wonderful new vistas for understanding 
the development of the Decretum.  On the St. Gall manuscript see Carlos 
Larrainzar’s essays,  ‘El borrador del la ‘Concordia’ de Graziano: Sankt 
Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek MS 673 (=Sg)’, 9 (1999) Ius ecclesiae: Rivista 
internazionale di diritto canonico 593-666 and  ’El decreto de Graciano del 
códice Fd (=Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conventi Soppressi 
A.I.402): In memoriam Rudolf Weigand’, Ius ecclesiae: Rivista 
internazionale di diritto canonico 10 (1998) 421-489.  I will limit my citations 
to the rather large literature that has been published since 1998.  Almost all the 
relevant essays touching upon the issues that I mention in my first paragraphs 
are dealt with in essays printed in the BMCL between 1998 and 2013 and the 
ZRG, Kan. Abt. during the same period.   See especially Melodie H. 
Eichbauer,  ‘Gratian’s Decretum and the Changing Historiographical 
Landscape’,  History Compass 11/12 (2013): 1111-1125. 
2
  Melodie H. Eichbauer, ‘From the First to the Second Recension:  The 
Progressive Evolution of the Decretum’, BMCL 29 (2011-2012) 119-167. 
Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law 31 (2014) 111-124
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The value of the Saint Gall manuscript is particularly 
controverted.3   In my opinion no one has been able to prove 
conclusively that it is an abbreviation — or the contrary.  The 
winnowing and sifting of the evidence proceeds apace.  The 
status of Saint Gall is primarily important for understanding how 
Gratian began to teach canon law.  My conviction that it 
represents how Gratian first began to teach canon law in the 
1120’s cannot be proven conclusively now and probably never 
will be unless we find other manuscript evidence.  Still, the 
format of the manuscript contains a powerful clue.  It only 
contains the causae.  They were Gratian’s remarkable contri-
bution to twelfth-century education.  He invented a system of 
teaching law that depended on introducing his students to 
hypothetical cases based on legal problems that could have easily 
been heard in the courts during the first half of the twelfth 
century.  In addition Gratian employed the dialectical method-
logy created by the masters in northern France to legal problems.  
I think the great success of the Decretum and its immediate and 
enthusiastic adoption by teachers from Italy to Spain and from 
Austria to northern France (to rely on the manuscripts that have 
survived), can be attributed to his case-law methodology that 
reflected legal problems that Gratian and his students would have 
encountered when they had visited episcopal tribunals and heard 
about various cases.4 
When Winroth and Larrainzar established the existence 
of different recensions of Gratian’s Decretum in the manuscripts, 
scholars immediately realized that they might begin to see how 
Gratian’s thought evolved on various subjects.  Unfortunately, to 
date they have uncovered very little evidence about the 
development of Gratian’s thought in any area of law.  Winroth 
3
 I discuss St. Gall at length in ‘The Biography of Gratian: The Father of 
Canon Law’, University of Villanova Law Review 59 (2014) 679-706. 
4
 Not everyone agrees that Gratian drew upon real life for his examples; 
Anders Winroth argued that Gratian’s hypothetical cases were not real court 
cases, ‘The Teaching of Law in the Twelfth Century’, Law and Learning in 
the Middle Ages: Proceedings of the Second Carlsberg Academy Conference 
on Medieval Legal History, 2005, edd. Helle Vogt and Mia Münster-
Swendsen (Copenhagen   2006) 41-61 at 47. 
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has attempted to demonstrate that Gratian changed his opinion 
about the primacy of spousal consent in marriage law and about 
the validity of the marriage of slaves. 5  In both of these cases the 
evidence is not without ambiguity. 
While preparing a talk on Gratian’s treatment of the Jews, 
I noticed that the canons Gratian included in his Decretum to 
establish norms for the legal status of the Jews were not in St. 
Gall or in the other pre-vulgate manuscripts.  He treated the legal 
status of Jews only in his last, vulgate version of the Decretum.6  
This fact raises the question why did Gratian become interested 
in the Jews ca. 1140, the date of Gratian’s final recension?7  I 
have yet to find a convincing explanation.  There were notorious 
Jewish cases in the mid-twelfth century that might have attracted 
Gratian’s notice, but he provided no clues in the dicta around 
these canons which events may have captured his attention.  
These additional canons are not, however, an example of the 
evolution of Gratian’s thought; they are an example of Gratian’s 
beginning to have thoughts on an issue rather late in the game. 
Gratian introduced his students to the legal status of Jews 
in four significant clusters of texts that are not in St. Gall nor in 
the pre-vulgate manuscripts.  He added them to two distinctions 
5
 Anders Winroth, ‘Marital Consent in Gratian’s Decretum’,  Readers, Texts 
and Compilers in the Earlier Middle Ages: Studies in Medieval Canon Law in 
Honour of Linda Fowler-Magerl, ed. Martin Brett and Kathleen G. Cushing 
(Farnham, Surrey and Burlington, CT: 2009) 111-121 at 115 n.29 and his 
essay ‘Neither Slave nor Free:  Theology and Law in Gratian’s Thoughts on 
the Definition of Marriage and Unfree Persons’, Medieval Church Law and 
the Origins of the Western Legal Tradition: A Tribute to Kenneth Pennington, 
edd. Wolfgang P. Müller and Mary E. Sommar    (Washington, D.C.  2006) 
97-109. 
6
 They are in the margins or the appendices of Florence, Barcelona, and 
Admont.  That means the canons came to Gratian’s attention well before he 
stopped working on the Decretum, see Eichbauer, ‘From the First to the 
Second Recension’ 154, 156, 161,  164. 
7
 For the evolution of Gratian’s Decretum see Peter Landau, ‘Gratian and the 
Decretum Gratiani’, The History of Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140-
1234: From Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, ed. Wilfried 
Hartmann and K. Pennington (History of Medieval Canon Law; Washington, 
D.C.  2008) 22-54. 
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and two causae.  In Distinctio 45 canons 3, 4 and 5, Gratian 
raised the issue of the validity of coerced conversions of Jews 
and more generally how Christian rulers, especially ecclesiastical 
authorities, should treat them.  Distinctio 54 canons 13, 14, 15 
established that Jews cannot have or own Christian servants,  
they cannot hold public office, and Jewish slaves who convert to 
Christianity are freed.  Further along in the Decretum he added 
C.17 q.4 c.31 and dicta p.c.30 and p.c.31, in which he repeated 
the norm that Jews cannot hold public office.  In Causa 2 
quaestio 7 canons 24-25, Gratian discussed procedure and noted 
that Jews could not bring suit against a Christian in court.  
Finally, in his treatise on marriage, Causa 28 quaestio 1 canons 
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, he included canons that forbade interreligious 
marriages and mandated that Jews who marry Christian women 
must convert.  Further, Christian children must be removed from 
Jewish parents and relatives, and Jewish converts must be 
separated from other Jews.  Finally, Christians may not marry 
Jews under any circumstances. In this essay I will focus on the 
problems raised by the coerced conversion of Jews in Distinction 
45.   
The dictum at the beginning of D.45 is strange: ‘Sequitur 
“non percussorem”.’   Friedberg’s footnote explains that this is a 
reference to 1 Timothy c.3 verses 2-5, which reads: 
Oportet ergo episcopum irreprehensibilem esse, unius uxoris virum, 
sobrium prudentem, ornatum, pudicum, hospitalem, doctorem, non 
vinolentum, non percussorem, sed modestum, non litigiosum .  .  . 
non neophytum. 
A little searching in the Decretum reveals that Gratian cited the 
first part of 1 Timothy at the beginning of D.36, and that he dealt 
with ‘ornatus et hospitalis’ in D.40 and D.41-D.42,  ‘pudicus’ in 
D.43, a ‘vinolentus’ and clerical drunkeness in D.44, ‘non 
percussorem’ in D.45, ‘non litigiosum’ in D.46,8 and ‘neophyti’ 
in D.48 as guidelines to episcopal rectitude.9   After D.48 Gratian 
abandoned 1 Timothy as a framework for discussing clerical 
8
 1 Timothy 3.3. 
9
 It was quite natural that Gratian would have used 1 Timothy as an outline for 
episcopal and clerical rectitude.  I discuss Gratian’s use of Timothy in 
‘Biography of Gratian’ 696-697. 
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discipline.  In Gratian’s notation at the beginning of D.45 in all 
the recensions of Gratian, he seems to have assumed that the 
reader would remember from his reference to 1 Timothy in D.36 
and, from his using words from 1 Timothy in D.40-44, that ‘non 
percussorem’ followed ‘vinolentum’ in the epistle of the Pseudo-
Paul.   The dictum in St. Gall was more helpful as a aide-
mémoire than the dictum in in the later recensions:10 
Neque percussor iuxta eundem (i.e. the author of 1 Timothy) esse 
debet.  Non enim oportet episcopum irascibilem et animi esse turbati 
ubi percutiat quia patiens debet esse et eum sequi qui dorsum posuit 
ad flagella. 
This more extensive reminder to the reader was necessary there, 
perhaps, because St. Gall did not include the texts in D.44 on 
drunkeness nor did he include the texts from D.40-41-42-43.  St. 
Gall did contain D.46.  Do these omissions provide evidence that 
St. Gall is an abbreviation?  I think not.   In St. Gall, Gratian was 
discussing a particular case.  In his later recensions he outlined 
the norms for proper clerical behavior using Timothy as a rough 
guide.    
In St. Gall and the other pre-vulgate manuscripts, the 
texts contained in D.45 focused on irascible prelates who abused 
their subjects.  Although the connection between cantankerous 
Christian prelates and Jews is not obvious,  Gratian  inserted 
three canons on the legal status of Jews in his vulgate recension 
at D.45.  Pope Gregory I’s letter provided the text for c.3, Pope 
Gregory IV’s for c.4, and the Fourth  Council of Toledo (A.D. 
633) canon 57 was the final addition.  Pope Gregory I’s letter 
reminded Pascasius, the bishop of Naples, that the Jews of 
Naples should not be prevented from celebrating their festivities.  
Pope Gregory IV’s letter emphasized that prelates should not 
correct their subjects harshly, including, he stated, the 
‘presumption of the Jews’. 
The most important text in D.45 was the canon from the 
Council of Toledo that stipulated that that Jews should not be 
coerced to accept the Christian faith, but if they became 
Christians, they should be compelled to remain Christian. This 
10
 St. Gall, Stiftsbibliothek 673 p.13a. 
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canon circulated widely in pre-Gratian canonical collections.  
Twenty-two extant collections contain it.  Uncharacteristically, 
Gratian resolved the question without creating any distinctions.  
His reading of the conciliar canon was brutally simple:  ‘Jews 
should not be forced to convert to the faith, but if they were 
unwillingly converted, they must remain Christian’.11  In short, if 
a Jew was baptized, he became a Christian.  What if the baptism 
was coerced?  All the later jurists talked about the forced 
conversion of Jews when they glossed D.45. Gratian’s successors 
developed a flexible doctrine.  They created a distinction 
between conditional and absolute coercion, which was  
determined by the Roman law principles but not by the language 
of Roman law.12  They concluded that a forced conversion or 
baptism of a Jew was valid if bestowed under only moderate 
terror.  
The text of the conciliar canon was not precise on what 
ceremony or step constituted a valid conversion.  It did state that 
if  Jews had been forcibly converted and received the major 
sacraments, they could be coerced to remain Christians (D.45 
c.5):
De Iudeis autem precepit sancta sinodus, nemini deinceps uim ad 
credendum inferre. ‘Cui enim uult Deus miseretur, et quem uult 
indurat ‘.  Non enim tales inviti salvandi sunt, sed volentes, ut integra 
sit forma iustitie. Sicut enim homo propria arbitrii voluntate serpenti 
obediens periit, sic vocante se gratia Dei proprie mentis conversione 
quisque credendo salvatur.  Ergo non vi, sed libera arbitrii facultate 
ut convertantur suadendi sunt, non potius inpellendi.  Qui autem 
iampridem ad Christianitatem coacti sunt, sicut factum est 
temporibus religiosissimi principis Sisebuti, quia iam constat eos 
sacramentis diuinis associatos, et baptismi gratiam suscepisse, et 
11
 D.45 c.5; Gratian concluded in his dictum after c.4 that this conciliar canon 
meant that ‘Iudei non sunt cogendi ad fidem, quam tamen si inviti susceperint, 
cogendi sunt retinere’.  On the Jews in canon law see Walter Pakter, Medieval 
Canon Law and the Jews (Abhandlungen zur rechtwissenschaftlichen 
Grundlagenforschung 68; Ebelsbach  1988). 
12
 For a detailed discussion of when fear invalidated an action, see Stephan 
Kuttner, Kanonistische Schuldlehre von Gratian bis auf die Dekretalen 
Gregors IX: Systematisch auf Grund der handschriftlichen Quellen 
dargestellt.  (Studi e Testi 64; Città del Vaticano  1935, reprinted 1961) 299-
314. 
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crismate unctos esse, et corporis Domini extitisse participes, oportet, 
ut fidem, quam vi vel necessitate susceperint, tenere cogantur, ne 
nomen Domini blasphemetur, et fides, quam susceperunt, vilis ac 
contemptibilis, habeatur. (This holy synod commands that Jews not 
be forced to believe. Rather, God has mercy on those he chooses and 
punishes others he does not (Rom. 9:18). The unwilling must not be 
saved but only the willing, as an example of a complete model of 
justice. As man perished by willingly obeying the serpent, he is saved 
through the grace of God by believing.  Therefore the Jews are not to 
be converted by force but by persuasion and through their free will. 
Those who have already been forced to convert to Christianity, as 
had occurred during the time of the most pious ruler Sisebut, since 
they have accepted the divine sacraments, received the grace of 
baptism, the anointed with holy oil, and taken the body of the Lord, 
they must remain in the faith that they received whether by force or 
by necessity so that the name of the Lord and the faith they hold not 
be considered vile and contemptible.) 
Must a Jew have received all the appropriate sacraments to 
become a Christian?  Christian thinkers had very early on 
concluded that a valid baptism was the key to becoming a 
Christian.13  An anonymous glossator commented on the words 
‘willing, as an example of a complete model of justice,’ ‘Namely 
to come to the sacrament of baptism’.14  From the early twelfth 
century on, baptism became the liturgical act and the sacrament 
that defined a Christian from a non-Christian and established 
‘citizenship’ within the Christian church. 
The most important canonist of the twelfth century, 
Huguccio established the jurisprudential ground rules for 
defining what constituted a forced valid conversion or baptism.  
In a gloss to the Toledo conciliar canon, Huguccio explored what 
constituted consent of a Jew to baptism.  Rufinus had already 
defined coercion as either absolute or conditional when he 
13
 Jean Gaudemet, ‘“Baptisumus, ianua sacramentorum” CJC, c. 849: 
Baptême et droits de l’homme’, Rituels: Mélanges offerts au R.P. Pierre-
Marie Gy, edd. P. d Clerck and E. Palazzo (Paris 1990) 273-282, reprinted in 
La doctrine canonique médiévale (Collected Studies; Aldershot-Brookfield 
1994).  
14
 Köln, Erzbischöfliche Diözesan- und Dombibliothek 127, fol. 43v 
interlinear gloss to D.45 c.5 s.v. volentes: ‘scilicet ad sacramentum salutis 
uenire’. 
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discussed the validity of oaths.15  Huguccio applied the 
terminology to coerced baptisms:16 
I distinguish between absolute and conditional coercion:  If anyone is 
baptized by absolute coercion, for example if one person tied him 
down and another poured water over him, unless he consents 
afterwards, he ought not to be forced to embrace the Christian faith.  
Because he believed that baptism was valid whether willing or 
unwilling, awake or sleeping, he concluded posterior consent 
made a Jew a Christian.17  Not all later jurists accepted 
Huguccio’s reasoning.  They held that invalid acts could never 
been validated by later consent. For example, invalid 
confessions extracted by torture were never valid ex post 
factum.18  Huguccio specified in some detail exactly what 
constituted conditional coercion:19 
If someone is baptized under conditional coercion, for example if I 
say I will beat, rob, kill, or injure you, unless you are baptized, he can 
be forced to hold the faith, because from conditional coercion an 
unwilling person is made into a willing person, and as a willing 
person is baptized.  A coerced choice is a choice, and makes consent.  
15
 Rufinus, Summa decretorum to C.22 q.5 c.1 s.v. Qui compulus, ed. Heinrich 
Singer (Paderborn  1902, reprinted Aalen  1963) 399-402. 
16
 Huguccio, Summa to D. 45 c.5 s.v. associatos unctos corporis Domini, 
Lons-le-Saunier, Archives départementales du Jura 16, fol. 61v, Admont, 
Stiftsbibliothek 7, fol. 61v,  Vat. lat. 2280, fol. 44r: ‘De coactione autem 
distinquo, aut est absoluta aut est conditionalis.  Si absoluta coactione quis 
baptizetur, puta unus tenet eum ligatum et alius superfundit aquam, nisi (ubi 
Lons-le-Saunier) postea consentiat, non debet cogi ad fidem Christianam 
tenendam’.  Condorelli, Libertà 55-56 prints this text from Franz Gillmann, 
Die Notwendigkeit der Intention auf Seiten des Spenders und des Empfängers 
der Sakramente nach der Anschauung der Frühscholastik (Mainz  1916)  16. 
17
 Ibid.: ‘quia sive volens sive nolens, vigilans sive dormiens quis baptizetur in 
forma ecclesie sacramentum accipit’. 
18
 See my essay ‘Torture and Fear:  Enemies of Justice’, RIDC 19 (2008) 
203-242. 
19
 Huguccio, Summa to D. 45 c.5 s.v. associatos unctos corporis Domini, 
Lons-le-Saunier, Archives départementales du Jura 16, fol. 61v, Admont, 
Stiftsbibliothek 7, fol. 61v,  Vat. lat. 2280, fol. 44r: ‘Si vero coactione 
conditionali quis baptizetur, puta: te verberabo vel spoliabo bel interficiam vel 
leda, nisi baptizeris, debet cogi ut fiedm teneat, quia per talem coactionem de 
nolente efficitur quid volens, et volens baptizatur.  Voluntas enim coacta 
voluntas est et volentem facit, ut xv. q.i. Merito (C.15 q.1 c.1)’. 
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Thirteenth-century jurists found Huguccio’s definitions of 
conditional coercion persuasive.  Raymond of Peñafort (ca. 
1234) accepted conditional coercion conferred a valid baptism 
but did not accept Huguccio’s conviction that absolute coercion 
could confer a valid sacrament.  Pope Innocent III had issued the 
decretal Maiores in which almost the entire last part of De Iudeis 
was quoted.   The pope declared that if a Jew had adamantly and 
steadfastly refused to accept baptism, the sacrament and the 
conversion were not valid.20  Innocent’s decretal was the last 
piece of papal canonical jurisdiction that directly touched upon 
the issue of coerced baptisms. 
Maiores and De Iudeis left many questions open.  A 
significant issue  was the fate of Jewish children in families in 
which one of the parents became Christian or in which the 
parents did not convert, but in which a child had been baptized.  
A case decided in 1229 at the papal curia about the status of a 
Jewish child became a bench mark for deciding the rights of the 
father, mother and child for centuries.  Raymond de Peñafort 
included the appellate decision in the Decretales of Gregory IX.21  
A Jew in Strasbourg had converted to Christianity and left a 
staunchly Jewish wife and four year old son behind.  He had 
petitioned the bishop to grant him custody of his son.  He wanted 
to baptize him and raise him as a Christian.  The man made only 
one argument, at least only one argument was reported in the 
decision: his son should be given to him immediately to be raised 
a Catholic.  Remarkably, the mother appeared before an episco-
pal synod which heard the case.  She presented arguments that 
still resonate with maternal love.  The boy was young.  He 
needed the consolation of his mother more than his father.  His 
gestation had been difficult, his birth painful, and his post partum 
strenuous.  From these facts the court should understand that the 
legitimate conjoining of a man and a woman is called 
20
 Summa de penitentia (Rome  1603) 33: ‘quia corporaliter cum violentia 
traherentur et super infunderetur aqua, non conferretur character baptismi, 
extra de bapt. et eius effectu, Maiores, circa finem (3 Comp. 3.34.1 = X 
3.42.3)’. 
21
 X 3.33.2. 
120 KENNETH PENNINGTON 
matrimony, not patrimony.  A mother’s rights should not be 
abrogated to appease a paternalistic jurisprudence.  It was a 
strikingly clever argument that the jurists pondered for centuries 
afterwards.  Her last argument was especially touching.  The 
bishop had custody of the boy during the hearing, but his mother 
pleaded that the boy should remain with her since her husband 
had only recently converted.  Failing that solution, neutral custo-
dians should take care of the boy until he reached majority.22  
This mother’s plea did not move the court. 
After  the mid-thirteenth century,  the jurists used a new 
genre of literature, the consilium,  to expand their discussion of 
the legal status of converted Jews and their children.23  Two of 
the earliest consilia I know that deal with the legal status of Jews 
date from the second half of the thirteenth century. They treated 
the baptism of Jewish children and much more.   A Dominican 
inquisitor, Florio da Vicenza, was particularly interested in 
relapsed baptized Jews who had ‘Judaized’.24  A similar problem 
was posed by Jews who persecuted other Jews who had 
converted to Christianity.  The inquisitor’s zeal led him into 
22
 X 3.33.2: ‘Ad quod illa respondit, quod, cum puer adhuc infans exsistat, 
propter quod magis materno indiget solatio quam paterno, sibique ante partum 
onerosus, dolorosus in partu, [ac] post partum laboriosus fuisse noscatur, ac 
ex hoc legitima coniunctio maris et feminae magis matrimonium quam 
patrimonium nuncupetur, dictus puer apud eam debet convenientius remanere, 
[quam apud patrem ad fidem Christianam de novo perductum transire 
debebat, aut saltem neutrius sequi, priusquam ad legitimam aetatem 
perveniat. Hinc inde multis aliis allegatis: tu autem praedicto puero medio 
tempore in tua potestate retento, quid tibi faciendum sit in hoc casu nos 
consulere voluisti (pars decisa in the  Decretales).]’. 
23
 Mario Ascheri has devoted a lifetime of scholarship to the medieval and 
early modern consilia, e.g  ‘“Consilium sapientis”, perizia medica e “res 
iudicata”: Diritto dei “dottori” e istituzioni comunali’, Proceedings Berkeley 
1980 532-579 and ‘Legal Consulting in the Civil Law Tradition’, Legal 
Consulting in the Civil Law Tradition, edd. Mario Ascheri, Ingrid 
Baumgärtner, and Julius Kirshner (Studies in Comparative Legal History; 
Berkeley 1999) 11-53. 
24
  Riccardo Parmeggiani, I consilia procedurali per l’inquisizione medievale 
(1235-1330)  (Bologna 2011) 121-122; Bolognese jurists repeated much of the 
consilium in their own that Parmeggiani prints on pp. 126-128.  The jurists 
debated this question in consilia until the early modern period. 
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uncharted legal territory.  A number of jurists from Padua or 
possibly Bologna responded to his questions about several cases 
on his docket that involved Jews.  The questions posed by 
Brother Florio indicate that Jews were only recently coming to 
the attention of inquisitors and also reveal how little help the 
normative texts in the canonical collections were in solving more 
intricate problems.  The jurists dealt with eight questions that 
Florio must have asked them to answer.  The first was whether 
relapsed Jews should have the legal status of heretics and be 
subject to the inquisitor’s court.  The answer was simply yes, 
without any explanation of their reasoning.25 
The second question was more ominous and threatening 
to the Jewish communities.  Could Jews who aided and abetted 
relapsed Jews be tried in inquisitorial courts as ‘supporters, 
receivers, and defenders of heretics?’26  The jurists said yes.  
They also provided insight into their reasoning:  the Jews held 
their legal rights in Christian society only as a privilege, not as a 
right.  The jurists concluded by citing legal maxim that had long 
been embedded in canonical jurisprudence:  those that abused 
their privileges lost them.27   
The next two questions involved procedure.  When and 
how could Jews be tortured?  If the proofs contained 
‘presumptiones violentae’, that is evidence that fell just short of 
complete proof, Jews could be tortured.  This standard was 
common in the procedural literature of the Ius commune for 
25
 Ibid. 124. 
26
 Ibid: ‘dicunt eum posse et debere procedere contra eos sicut contra fautores, 
receptores et defensores hereticorum’.  This language was taken from 
decretals and secular legislation; see my ‘Pro peccatis patrum puniri:  A Moral 
and Legal Problem of the Inquisition’, Church History 47 (1978) 137-154, 
reprinted with additions in Popes, Canonists and Texts, 1150-1550  (Aldershot 
1993) XI  pp. 3-16, especially at 11-12. 
27
  Ibid. 124: ‘Licet Iudei ab ecclesia in suis ritibus tollerentur, tamen ratione 
delicti quod in ecclesiam committunt, sunt severitate ecclesiastica 
coherecendi.  Et privilegium meretur amittere qui permissa sibi abutitur 
potestate’.  See D.74 c.6 and C.11 q.3 c.63 for the earliest appearance of this 
maxim in canon law.  It did not have its roots in Roman law. 
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determining whether a person could be tortured.28  It is striking 
that the jurists applied the same principles to Jews as they did to 
Christians.  They also concluded that Jews could not be tortured 
in ways that would draw blood.29  This limitation seems to imply 
that the jurists did not consider relapsed Jews to have committed 
a crime. 
The other points in the ‘consilium’ covered Jews who 
used their synagogues to wash away baptisms of Christians or in 
which they circumcised Christians.  These synagogues should be 
destroyed.30  The seventh question in the ‘consilium’ was what 
should be done with a Jewish child of  a baptized Jew (i.e. 
Christian), who was away or in regions unknown.  Could the 
child remain with Jewish mother? The jurists did not hesitate to 
take the child away from his mother on the grounds of the ‘favor 
fidei’.  It had become the common opinion of the jurists, 
following the precedent of Pope Gregory IX’s decretal (X 3.33.2) 
(discussed above) that a Jewish child of a mixed marriage should 
live with the Christian parent.31  The Church, the local bishop, or 
the Christian prince should take the child to be raised by 
Christians who were not suspect and who were baptized.  They 
granted an exception:  unless the child had the ‘impediment of a 
contrary will (obex contrariae voluntatis)’.  This strange 
terminology dates back to a similar phrase of Saint Augustine 
and had been employed by Pope Innocent III,  theologians and 
canonists to evaluate the intentions of those who received 
28
 Pennington, ‘Torture and Fear:  Enemies of Justice’, RIDC 19 (2008)  203-
242. 
29
 Parmeggiani, I consilia procedurali 124: ‘potest et debet eam extorquere 
suppliciis citra effusionemm sanguinis per executorem vel iudicem 
secularem’. 
30
 Ora Limor, ‘Christians and Jews’, The Cambridge History of Christianity, 
4: Christianity in Western Europe c. 1100-1500, edd. Miri Rubin and Walter 
Simons (Cambridge 2009) 494-556, with bibliography; also R. Po-Chia Hsia, 
The Myth of Ritual Murder:  Jew and Magic in Reformation Germany (New 
Haven 1988). 
31
 Pakter, Medieval Canon Law and the Jews 318-321. 
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baptism in order to judge whether the baptism was validly 
bestowed.32 
Pope Nichaolas III declared in a letter dated 1277 that 
Jews who converted under threats of death cannot return to 
Jewish practices because they were not ‘absolutely and exactly 
coerced (absolute seu precise coacti)’.  Gradually the ‘praecisa 
coactio’ replaced ‘absoluta coactio’ in the terminology of the 
jurists.33  Pope Boniface VIII used that  terminology in his 
decretal letter Contra Christianos that was later included in his 
Liber Sextus.  The pope also confirmed the opinions of the jurist 
who advised Florio da Vicenza that relapsed Jews were to be 
equated with heretics and that any Jews who aided or abetted 
those Jews who had apostatized were subject to the jurisdiction 
of Christian courts and could be punished with the same penalties 
as those imposed upon relapsed Jews.34 
Gratian inclusion of the Fourth Council of Toledo’s fifty-
seventh canon on Jews shaped the legal discussion of the legal 
status of baptized Jews for centuries.  One puzzle must remain 
unresolved: why did Gratian not include canons on Jews in 
earlier recensions?  An easy answer that I do not find convincing 
is that from the First Crusade on, Jews became a legal problem in 
the Latin West.  Gratian was well aware that the major pre-
Gratian canonical collections, which were all divided into books 
and titles, often had sections devoted to the Jews.35  Jews had 
32
 Parmeggiani, I consilia procedurali 125: ‘parvulus filius Iudei baptizati 
existens apud matrem que remansit in Iudaica cecitate patre absente in remotis 
partibus et ignotis, favore fidei est accipeindus ab eo per ecclesiam vel loci 
ordinarium seu principem Christianum, cuius subest dominio; et nutriendus 
apud fideles non suspectos et baptizandus, nisi obex in eo contrarie 
voluntatis’.  On the phrase ‘obex contrariae voluntatis’ and issue of forced 
baptism, see Mario Condorelli, I fondamenti giuridici della tolleranza 
religiosa nell'elaborazione canonistica dei secoli XII-XIX: Contributo storico-
dogmatico (2nd. ed. Università di Catania Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di 
Giurisprudenza 36; Milano 1960) 88-105. 
33
 ‘Praecisa coactio’ is not a term of Roman law;  the Roman jurists did use 
‘praecise’ in several different contexts’, e.g. Dig. 36.3.1.20. 
34
 VI 5.2.13. 
35
 E.g. Burchard of Worms, Decretum 4.81-88, Collection in Three Books 3.6, 
Polycarpus, Collectio canonum 7.13 and many others. 
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always presented legal problems.  There were many earlier texts 
in canonical collections that treated Jews.  Gratian knew them.  It 
is possible that the idea slowly dawned on Gratian that he should 
consider Jews, perhaps for a number of different reasons. Unlike 
all earlier collections Gratian did not divide his collection into 
books and titles.  None of Gratin’s distinctiones and causae dealt 
with Jews in Christian society.  When he decided to include 
canons on Jews, the structure of the Decretum limited the places 
where he could place Jewish material.  Consequently, all the 
canons he included treating the legal status of Jews were 
awkwardly placed in causae that dealt with other issues.  Perhaps 
that is a metaphor for the status of Jews and other non-Christians 
in medieval Christian society. 
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